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With the completion of many of the ambitious infrastructural projects
that have catapulted Saudi Arabia into the twentieth century, the need of
the Saudi Government to attract non-Saudi companies to undertake these
types of projects has largely disappeared. While development proceeds
apace in Saudi Arabia, it does so at a less frenetic tempo than in the
recent past. In the midst of this development the Saudi business climate
has matured, and with it the Saudi commercial legal system. Handshake
deals have largely been relegated to folklore, having been replaced by
lengthy, heavily boilerplated contracts, often negotiated by lawyers for
each side. A bureaucracy has not merely begun to creep into all aspects
of Saudi economic life, especially in the area of public sector purchases
and construction, it has started to gallop.
In this context it is perhaps inevitable that litigation should become an
increasingly commonplace and culturally acceptable means of dispute
resolution. The last several years have witnessed a substantial increase
in the use of the Saudi courts as a means of resolution of commercial
disputes. Whereas only a few years ago parties to disputes often went to
great and frequently generous lengths to avoid legal proceedings, today
parties to disputes in both the public and the private sectors seem much
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more willing to air their differences in the Saudi courts. The reasons for
this development are beyond the scope of this article and in any event
are more the domain of sociologists than practicing lawyers. One can
speculate, however, that the transition of the Saudi economy from "boom
times" to the "real world," and the increasing sophistication of busi-
nessmen and government technocrats, have encouraged Saudis to con-
sider litigation as a practical and savory means of dispute resolution. As
practicing lawyers we have seen on a daily basis the results of this new
acceptance of the litigation tool. Although official statistics are lacking,
our experience and that of our colleagues is that the number of commercial
disputes in litigation in Saudi Arabia is definitely increasing.
As a ubiquitous party to Saudi commercial contracts, the Government
of Saudi Arabia has not escaped the effects of this increase in commercial
disputes and litigation. In recent years, Saudi Arabia's administrative
court, the Board of Grievances, has taken on an increasing significance
as effectively the only forum for claims against Saudi public sector entities.
This article presents a brief introduction to the Board of Grievances. After
giving a general overview of the Saudi legal system and a brief history of
the Board, the article examines the composition, practices, and proce-
dures of the Board, along with a practical outline of how an action is
presented and pursued before the Board.
I. Background to Islamic Legal Concepts
and the Saudi Legal System
A. RELIGIOus BACKGROUND
The word "law" in Saudi Arabia is generally understood to refer to
Islamic law or what is called the "Shari'ah." The Shari'ah has four primary
sources. The first of these is the Quran, which Muslims believe is the
word of God delivered to God's messenger, Mohammed. The Quran con-
tains numerous principles and guidelines for human behavior in both sec-
ular and religious life.
The second primary source of the Shari'ah is called the "Sunna," and
is comprised of that which the Prophet Mohammed was reported to have
said, done, or approved. The Sunna, a major source of the Shari'ah, is
based on a passage in the Quran that reads: "You shall observe whatever
the Prophet directs you to do and you shall refrain from whatever he
forbids you from doing."' The Sunna thus expounds, elaborates and ex-
plains many of the general rules of the Quran.
I. Quran, Sura 59, Ayat (verse) 7.
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The third source of Islamic law is called "Ijmah": the consensus of
scholars. If at a given time in history, all reputable Islamic scholars agreed
on a certain rule as being the "Islamic" response to a specific question,
such agreement or consensus was treated as a binding rule of the Shari'ah.
jmah derives its authority from a saying of the Prophet Mohammed that
"my people would never unanimously agree on a wrongful thing. ' 2
The fourth primary source of the Shari'ah is "Kias," or analogy. A
feature of the Shari'ah, as of other legal systems, is that the application
of law to a specific matter should apply equally to an analogous matter,
because similar cases should lead to similar results. Since specific rules
in the Quran and the Sunna are limited in number and often general in
application, and since the consensus of all Islamic scholars is no longer
attainable as a practical matter due to the enormous geographical diversity
of the Islamic world, Kias has traditionally represented a vital and flexible
source of the Shari'ah.
B. SAUDI LEGAL SYSTEM
Saudi judicial institutions are divided into two general categories: the
Shari'ah courts and the specialized secular courts. The Shari'ah courts,
formerly courts of general jurisdiction, have had their jurisdiction increas-
ingly limited. In 1930 the late King Abdul-Aziz, the founder of Saudi
Arabia, promulgated the Commercial Courts Act, 3 which removed certain
commercial matters from the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah courts. Today
most controversies arising out of commercial matters in the private sector
are adjudicated either by the Commissions for the Settlement of Com-
mercial Disputes, which are three-judge panels comprised of two Shari'ah
trained judges and a legal advisor attached to the Ministry of Commerce,
or one of a number of other tribunals that have been established with
specific jurisdiction, such as the Labor courts4 and the Negotiable In-
struments Offices. 5
Rarely is any modern Saudi statute promulgated without a provision
either establishing a secular commission or tribunal to have jurisdiction
over disputes arising under the statute, or establishing the competence of
an existing secular court to adjudicate disputes that arise thereunder. As
2. 1 M.A. AL-ZAR'KA, AL MADAKHAL AL-FIG'HI AL-AM I'LA AL-HUKUK AL MA'DANIYA
17 (1952).
3. Royal Decree No. M/32 dated 15 Moharram 1350 H.
4. Royal Decree No. M/21 dated 6 Ramadhan 1389 H., Labor and Workmen Law arts.
172-188.
5. Ministry of Commerce Ministerial Resolution Nos. 353 and 354 dated 11 Jumad Awal
1388 H., and Ministry of Commerce Ministerial Resolution No. 358 dated 16 Jumad Awal
1388 H.
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a result, the Shari'ah courts have essentially been left with jurisdiction
only over cases involving family law, real property, and the majority of
criminal matters.
The promulgation of the Arbitration Regulations 6 in 1983 was thought
to presage a trend in private sector disputes towards the use of arbitration
as an efficient means of dispute resolution. In reality, the implementing
resolutions referred to in the Arbitration Regulations 7 have only recently
been adopted8 and remain largely untested, although it is expected that
this situation will change in the future. At the present time, resort to the
Saudi commercial courts remains by far the most common means of formal
dispute resolution for private sector disputes.
In disputes involving public sector entities virtually no opportunity
exists for formalized dispute resolution other than in a Saudi courtroom.
The Arbitration Regulations referred to above by their express terms
do not apply to Saudi governmental authorities except where approval
of the King has been obtained. 9 In addition, a 1963 decision of the
Council of Ministers proscribed arbitration as a means for resolving
disputes involving governmental authorities other than in "exceptional"
circumstances. 10 While the Arbitration Implementing Rules expressly
contemplate the availability of arbitration in public sector disputes on
a case by case basis, I I whether arbitration will in fact become a practical
means of dispute resolution in this area remains to be seen. Finally,
although Saudi Arabia is a party to the Convention of the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the ICSID),I 2 it seems
unlikely that arbitration proceedings involving a private sector litigant
and a Saudi governmental entity under the auspices of the ICSID could
occur due to various Shari'ah constraints beyond the scope of this
article.
Thus, for a private party with a claim against the Saudi Government
or any of its instrumentalities, the usual forum in Saudi Arabia is the
Board of Grievances (in Arabic, "Diwan AI-Mazal'im"). The word "usual"
6. Royal Decree No. M/46 dated 12 Rajab 1403 H. [hereinafter Arbitration Regulations].
7. Arbitration Regulations art. 24.
8. Rules for Implementation of the Arbitration Regulations published in the Official Ga-
zette, 10 Shawal 1405 [hereinafter Arbitration Implementing Rules].
9. Arbitration Regulations art. 3.
10. Council of Ministers Decision No. 58 dated 17 Moharram 1383 H. Pursuant to this
decision, Saudi governmental entities are also prohibited from agreeing to governing law
clauses in contracts that do not stipulate Saudi law.
II. Arbitration Implementing Rules art. 8.
12. The ICSID was ratified by the late King Khalid on I Jumad Thani 1400 H. Saudi
Arabia has also recently become a party to the Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency promulgated under the auspices of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. See 20 SAUDI ECON. SURV., 16 Apr. 1986, at 4.
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rather than "only" in this context is apt because in the Saudi Arabian
political system any person, Saudi or non-Saudi, has the right to seek
redress directly from the King. Over the years, we have had a number of
public works contract cases that we commenced by petitioning the King
directly rather than by filing a claim with the Board of Grievances. In one
of these cases both sides agreed as to liability; the only controversy was
as to quantum. The King accepted jurisdiction in the case and directed
that a technical committee be formed, which disposed of the matter in an
equitable fashion. Another such case involved a dispute in which our
client had performed an extensive and successful public works project
without a written contract. The absence of a written contract was said to
have been the result of the contracting agency's budgetary constraints.
This case was sent directly by the King to the Saudi Consulting House,13
which recommended a recovery reasonable to both parties. While in the-
ory such direct action by the King is possible in every case, as a practical
matter this option should not be considered as a realistic alternative to a
Board of Grievances proceeding except in the most unusual circumstances.
II. A Brief History of the Board of Grievances
The late King Abdul-Aziz, following the custom of Islamic rulers before
him, used to sit personally to try grievances. On 7 June 1926, the King
placed an announcement in the Urn Al Qurra (the newspaper of record
then and now) proclaiming that every person who had a complaint against
the Government must reduce it to writing and place it in a "complaints
box" to be located at a specified government building. The announcement
further stated that King Abdul-Aziz personally would keep the key to the
box. The King mandated that any person who had a complaint against an
official, senior or junior, or otherwise, must come forward and make his
grievance known; the announcement assured complainants that no harm
or prejudice would come to them by reason of their complaint.
Legislation creating a modern day version of the Board of Grievances
was promulgated by the late King Saud in 195514 and subsequently sup-
plemented in piecemeal fashion over the years. 15 In 1982 a comprehensive
Royal Decree promulgated by the late King Khalid provided the statutory
basis under which the Board of Grievances now operates.16
13. For a discussion of the Saudi Consulting House, see section VI.C infra.
14. Royal Decree No. M/2/13/8759 dated 17 Ramadhan 1374 H.
15. For example, see Board of Grievances Resolution No. 3570/1 dated I Dhual Hijjah
1379 H., and Council of Ministers Resolution No. 818 dated 17 Jumad Awal 1396 H. [here-
inafter Resolution 818].
16. Royal Decree No. M/51 dated 17 Rajab 1402 H. [hereinafter 1982 Law].
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Interestingly, the Board of Grievances functioned for over twenty years
as the primary adjudicatory authority for disputes arising between con-
tractors and governmental entities in respect of public sector projects
without any specific statutory authority for so doing. Neither the afore-
mentioned 1955 Decree establishing the modern day Board of Grievances
nor the various revisions throughout the years of the Tenders Regula-
tions, 17 which regulate Saudi governmental purchases and public sector
construction projects, expressly provided that the Board of Grievances
had such jurisdiction. However, most governmental contracts during this
period stipulated the Board of Grievances as the appropriate adjudicatory
authority in the event of disputes thereunder. Not until 1976 did the Coun-
cil of Ministers expressly vest the Board of Grievances with jurisdiction
over governmental contract disputes, 18 which disputes the Board of Griev-
ances had routinely been hearing for years.
I1. Jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances
As indicated previously, a comprehensive law governing the Board of
Grievances was promulgated in 1982. In many respects the 1982 Law
codified existing practices and previous piecemeal statutes. For example,
article (8)1.(d) of the 1982 Law expressly states that the Board of Griev-
ances has authority to decide "suits presented by those concerned in
disputes relating to contracts to which the [Saudi] government or a general
corporate person is a party."1 9 This wording covers the typical action in
which a contractor (be he a Saudi person or entity, or a non-Saudi entity)
in a public works project makes a claim against a Saudi governmental
"employer."
17. The most recent of which is Royal Decree No. M/14 dated 7 Rabi Thani 1397 H., the
Tenders Regulations [hereinafter Tenders Regs.], and Ministerial Resolution No. 2131/97
dated 5 Jumad Awal 1397 H., the Rules for Implementation of Tenders Regulations [here-
inafter Tenders Implementing Regs.].
18. See Resolution 818.
19. 1982 Law art. (8)1.(d). In a recent policy change, the Board of Grievances now also
will adjudicate disputes arising between Saudi contractors and the U.S. Corps of Engineers
acting as a contracting party on behalf of the Saudi Government pursuant to the Agreement
Relating to the Construction of Certain Military Facilities in Saudi Arabia, 24 May 1965-
June 1965, United States-Saudi Arabia, 16 U.S.T. 890, T.I.A.S. No. 5830, 548 U.N.T.S.
285, extended, 25 November 1981-10 May 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10388, extended, 25 June 1985-
8 July 1985. In addition, the 1982 Law does not define the term "general corporate person,"
but this term appears to refer to governmental entities such as Saudia (the Saudi flag airline),
the Saudi Seaports Authority, Petromin, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the Royal
Commission for Jubail and Yanbu and the like. In our view, however, controversies involving
entities with partial but not total Saudi governmental ownership, such as certain of the
petrochemical ventures, would not be adjudicated by the Board of Grievances unless a
particular statute provided otherwise. Instead, the general commercial courts (the Com-
missions for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes) would be the competent judicial fora
for actions against these types of entities.
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A claim against the Saudi Government arising out of the action or
inaction of a minister or a governmental agency alleged to be in excess
of or contrary to his or its authority would also be brought before the
Board of Grievances. 20 The Board is expressly prohibited, however, from
considering sovereign acts21 or the appropriateness or effect of statutes
and legal decisions of the general commercial or the Shari'ah courts. 22
Thus, a wrongful call of a bank guarantee in a public sector project would
be litigated before the Board of Grievances, as would a claim alleging a
minister had acted in excess of his authority. A claim by a contractor
alleging damages because of an action taken by a Saudi governmental
authority in accordance with a Saudi law, however, would not be heard
by the Board of Grievances and would probably not be justiciable in any
Saudi court.
The Board of Grievances is also empowered to enforce foreign judg-
ments. 23 Based on our experience, however, the only foreign judgments
the Board would enforce would probably be judgments issued by the
courts of Arab League States, which are governed by a specific treaty.24
Because of Shari'ah constraints, the Board of Grievances probably would
not enforce the judgment of a United States court; instead, a trial de novo
would be required with Saudi law as the governing law.
The Board of Grievances also decides questions arising out of, among
other things, trademark matters 25 and licenses issued by the Foreign Cap-
ital Investment Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity.26
In addition, the 1982 Law contains a catch-all provision that enables the
Council of Ministers to refer whatever matters "it deems fit" to the Board
of Grievances for consideration. 27
IV. Independence
The Board of Grievances is an independent judicial tribunal with ties
to no governmental authority other than the King. 28 That the Board is
directly answerable to the King provides to the fullest extent possible in
20. 1982 Law arts. (8)1.(b), (c).
21. Id. art. (9).
22. Id.
23. Id. art. (8)l.(g).
24. Agreement for the Execution of Court Decrees, 22 Safar 1372 H, translated in 2 M.
KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB LEAGUE 109 (1962).
25. Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 4 Jumad Awal 1404 H., Trademarks Regulations art.
59.
26. Royal Decree No. M/4 dated 2 Safar 1399 H., Foreign Capital Investment Code art. 10.
27. 1982 Law art. (8)2.
28. Id. art. (I). The first article of the 1982 Law states: "The Board of Grievances shall
be an independent administrative judicial board directly affiliated to His Majesty the King."
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a political system such as Saudi Arabia's that the Board is structurally
separate from the various governmental entities that are typically the
defendants in Board of Grievances proceedings. 29 The highest official
attached to the Board of Grievances, the President, is appointed by the
King, 30 and the 1982 Law specifically provides that the President is "di-
rectly answerable" to the King and has the rank of a Minister of State. 3 1
The President of the Board serves for a term determined by the King 32
and can be removed from office only by the King. 33 Other than the Pres-
ident, most ranking members of the Board of Grievances are, except for
a one-year probationary period, appointed for a term that ends upon the
member reaching seventy Hejira years of age 34 (roughly equivalent to
sixty-eight Gregorian years). If a judge "loses the trust and esteem re-
quired by his position," however, the King is empowered to remove him
earlier upon the recommendation of a committee of the Board of Griev-
ances. 35 Judges may also be removed for poor "efficiency." 36
Prior to the 1982 Law, the Board of Grievances, upon its receipt of a
claim, prepared a written summary thereof. Depending on the nature of
the claim, the Board then sent the summary to the King. If the King so
directed, the Board would accept the case for adjudication. If the King
did not consider it necessary or appropriate for the Board to decide the
case, the Board would decline to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter.
The King's prior approval was not generally necessary for the Board
of Grievances to hear claims alleging a breach by a governmental con-
tracting party of contractual provisions resulting in damages to a con-
tractor.37 Other types of claims, however, such as a claim based on loss
that was the result of unforeseen circumstances, did require such ap-
proval. We are aware of at least one instance in which a dispute involving
a claim under a Saudi public works contract was not considered by the
Board of Grievances because the King believed there was no justiciable
controversy. We petitioned the King a number of times without success
29. In disputes arising out of public sector contracts, the Saudi governmental party is
virtually always the defendant, largely because of three factors. First, that party is the
beneficiary of easily callable bank guarantees. Second, most Saudi Government construction
contracts provide that the Government may operate the contractor's equipment (leased or
owned) on site to complete a project. See Tenders Implementing Regs. art. 33. Third, the
Tenders Regulations specifically prohibit a contractor from stopping the work on the grounds
of breach by the Saudi governmental employer. Id. art. 29.
30. 1982 Law art. (3).
31. Id. arts. (2), (3).
32. Id. art. (3).
33. Id. art. (3).
34. Id. arts. (14), (15).
35. Id. art. (15).
36. Id. arts. (22), (26).
37. See Resolution 818.
VOL. 21, NO. 3
PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 835
to reconsider his decision, which essentially deprived our client of a forum
in which to adjudicate his claim.
Although neither the 1982 Law nor its predecessors made any substan-
tive mention of procedural matters, the pre-adjudication practice of ob-
taining the King's approval prior to the commencement of a Board action
appears to have changed with the advent of the 1982 Law, and the Board
no longer defers to the King prior to exercising its jurisdiction over dis-
putes otherwise within its competency. In our view it is unlikely the Board
would refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in a controversy arising out of
public works projects for reasons not connected with jurisdictional
considerations.
V. Composition of the Board of Grievances
At the present time six panels or committees of the Board of Grievances
have been established to hear cases involving public works contracts
disputes. Three of these panels sit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's capital; one
sits in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia's commercial center; one sits in Dammam
and one in Abha. Each panel is comprised of three judges.
Prior to the 1982 Law the Board of Grievances panels were typically
comprised of one Shari'ah trained judge who was usually a Saudi national,
and two legal advisors with backgrounds in public administrative law who
were Muslim Arabs but not necessarily Saudi Arabs. Because Saudi Arabia
had no administrative law tradition, many legal advisors from various
Arab states, notably Syria and Egypt, became actively involved in the
work of the Board of Grievances from its inception. Most of these advisors
were educated and trained in countries following or influenced by the
French legal system; consequently, many of the decisions drafted by these
legal advisors adopted the principles laid down by the Conseil d'Etat in
France to the extent such principles did not conflict with Shari'ah
precepts.38
The 1982 Law, however, brought about a major change in the compo-
sition of these panels. Each Board of Grievances panel is now comprised
of three Saudi judges who, among other qualifications, must be graduates
of a Shari'ah program of a Saudi university or the holders of another
"equivalent university degree." 39 To enable the judges to have some fa-
miliarity with the types of secular matters that are the subject matter of
Board of Grievances proceedings, new Board of Grievances judges are
38. For example, the Board of Grievances has in previous decisions accepted the principle
of compensating a contractor where unforeseeable circumstances altered the "balance" of
the contract against such contractor ("[a notion d'euilibre financier"). See Board of Griev-
ances Resolution No. 46/1398 in respect of Case No. 231/195/1396.
39. 1982 Law art. (I 1)(d).
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required to take a six-month course of study of Saudi Arabia's secular
laws at the Public Administration Institute in Riyadh.
Today, at least some of the panels still have foreign legal advisors (some
of whom were formerly members of Board of Grievances panels) attached
to them as advisors and consultants, but not judges. As Saudi judges,
with time, become more versed in their responsibilities, we expect the
role of these remaining legal advisors to decrease.
VI. A Board of Grievances Proceeding
Perhaps the most useful way to impart how the Board of Grievances
actually operates is to guide the reader through a routine proceeding from
its inception to its conclusion. We should stress, however, that the use
of the word "routine" to describe any legal proceeding in Saudi Arabia
must be viewed in the context of Middle Eastern judicial proceedings
generally. Although a substantial part of our own legal practice is com-
prised of litigation before the Board of Grievances and other Saudi courts,
we have yet to see any proceeding that could be described as "routine"
in the Western sense of that word.
The predecessor statutes to the 1982 Law made no provision for rules
of procedure. Although the 1982 Law provides that "rules of pleadings
and procedures ... shall be issued by a resolution of the Council of
Ministers," 40 to date that Council has issued no such rules. While this
situation enables a trial lawyer to be creative in areas where in other
jurisdictions rules of civil procedure might otherwise give rise to more
predictable proceedings, the lack of specified procedural and pleading
rules can occasionally frustrate the efficient progress of matters in liti-
gation. We understand that draft rules of procedure have been circulating
within the Board of Grievances, but we have no indication how quickly,
whether, or in what form such rules will be adopted.
A. COMMENCING AN ACTION
The claimant commences his case by filing a statement of claim either
with the office of the Board of Grievances located in the region in which
the events giving rise to the claim have occurred or with the President of
the Board of Grievances. If the latter, the President of the Board will
assign the claim to the panel in the appropriate region.
The statement can be as detailed or as brief as circumstances permit
and tactics dictate. At a minimum, the statement should indicate the names
of the parties, the jurisdictional basis of the action (for example, that the
40. Id. art. (49).
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claim arises out of a construction contract with a Saudi governmental
authority), the contractual provisions at issue, and a statement as to dam-
ages. In our experience, it is not necessary at this stage to quantify dam-
ages with precision, and it is usually sufficient to state that damages will
be specified and proved in subsequent hearings. With the statement of
claim the claimant's representative should submit evidence of his au-
thority to act on behalf of the claimant. This evidence is typically a power
of attorney, which if prepared outside Saudi Arabia must be notarized
and certified by the Saudi Consulate located in that area. The law does
not require that a litigant in a Board of Grievances case be represented
by counsel, although most non-Saudi claimants are. The Saudi Govern-
ment is usually, but not always, represented by counsel, typically from
in-house legal departments.
The language of the proceedings is Arabic, and all documents submitted
to the Board of Grievances must be submitted either in Arabic or with
an Arabic translation prepared by a licensed translator attached. Fre-
quently, public sector construction contracts are negotiated in English,
which is often the common language of the contractor and the Saudi
governmental employer's consultant or project manager. As a matter of
Saudi law, however, such contracts must be signed in Arabic and ac-
cordingly, the operative and legal language thereof is Arabic. 41 The im-
portance of contractors' satisfying themselves that the Arabic language
of the signed document accurately reflects the negotiated commercial
terms and intentions of the parties should be obvious. In our experience,
however, contractors take astonishingly little care in verifying the accu-
racy of the Arabic versions of contracts by which they will be legally
bound. We are involved at the present time in a case in which the inept
Arabic translation of a single but crucial word in a construction contract
clause has created considerable difficulties for our client, whose already
complex claims have been further complicated by this mistranslation.
Upon submission of the statement of claim, the staff of the Board of
Grievances prepares a summary thereof and submits it to the President.
The purpose of this summary appears to be to ensure that the Board of
Grievances has jurisdiction over the claim. Assuming it has jurisdiction,
the Board summons both parties to an initial hearing before the appro-
priate panel at a time chosen by the Board. The notice to the defendant
usually includes a copy of the plaintiff's statement of claim. The time lag
between the initial submission of a claim and the notice of the initial
hearing can be considerable.
41. Royal Decree No. 3/11/9574 dated 27 Rabi Thani 1401 H. and Royal Decree No. 3/1 l/
351 dated 20 Jumad Thani 1400 H.
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B. THE COURSE OF HEARINGS
Hearings before the Board of Grievances are relatively informal by
United States standards. The panel may question representatives of the
plaintiff and the defendant on points raised in submitted briefs or on other
matters of law or fact as the panel may deem appropriate or relevant. The
oral testimony of witnesses is not typically a feature of the hearings, but
in view of the flexible approach taken by the Board of Grievances as to
procedural matters generally, there would appear to be no reason why
witnesses could not be called and questioned. In fact, in a recent case
we called three expert witnesses to give oral as well as written testimony,
and the Board of Grievances accepted them.
In respect of civil matters before the Board of Grievances, no detailed
rules or procedures govern the introduction or suppression of evidence
or discovery. Generally speaking, the sessions consist of a wide-ranging
"give and take" among the parties to the litigation and the members of
the panel. Production of documents is routine and generally uncontested.
We should note, however, that in one of our ongoing cases discovery has
for the first time in our experience become a major issue in a Board of
Grievances proceeding. In this case, the defendant, a governmental con-
tracting agency, cited in a reply brief numerous documents that our client
had not seen. In accordance with usual practice, the defendant supplied
the documents to the Board, but in a departure from that practice refused
to provide copies to our client unless the Board formally ordered other-
wise. We petitioned the Board of Grievances on an ex parte basis to issue
such an order. The first and rather automatic reaction of the panel member
with whom our petition was lodged was that the documents requested
were "internal Government documents" and therefore could not be re-
leased "to the public." The controversy at issue, however, did not involve
a Ministry of Defense and Aviation contract or similar sensitive type of
contract. We took the matter, again on an ex parte basis, to a higher level
at the Board of Grievances, which indicated that we were entitled as a
matter of right to receive copies of any documents from the defendant
required in connection with the case and submitted to the Board of Griev-
ances. Even so, for reasons that never became apparent, the Board did
not order the defendant to supply such copies. While we were ultimately
able to see the documents, we were unable to photocopy them.
Hearings are scheduled in accordance with the panel's case load at any
given time. At present, the interval between hearings is usually four to
eight weeks, but the panel for the most part views with flexibility requests
to shorten or lengthen this period.
At the initial hearing one of two things usually happens. The defendant
may (and typically does) request a postponement, which the panel always
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grants. In general, unless it is obvious to the panel that one side is seeking
to gain tactical advantage by postponements, the panel readily grants
postponements without either party having to cite a compelling reason
therefor. As time goes on, however, the panel may begin to require at
least cursory reasons for a postponement and in certain circumstances
may refuse to grant a postponement, although this action would be un-
usual. If neither party requests a postponement, the defendant will instead
submit a rebuttal, usually summary in the extreme, to the plaintiff's state-
ment of claim. The plaintiff, on whose shoulders generally rests the entire
burden of proof, will then be requested by the Board of Grievances to
provide at the next hearing documents giving rise to and supporting his
claim.
At the end of each hearing, one or more of the judges on the panel
will dictate to the court clerk the official minutes of the hearing.
These minutes do not in fact fully summarize what occurred at the
hearing; there is no transcript or transcription per se prepared for
Board of Grievances hearings, and no court reporter in the American
sense of that term. Rather, these minutes record major admissions
or stipulations and set forth any additional documentation and written
briefs that the panel orders one or both of the litigants to submit at
the next hearing.
The rest of the Board of Grievances proceedings will consist of hearings
encompassing informal oral argument, the submission of reply briefs,
rebuttal briefs, counterreply briefs, and counterrebuttal briefs on issues
and subjects determined by the panel. The hearings conclude when the
panel feels it has all the evidence and information necessary to enable it
to render a decision, and when the parties to the proceeding believe that
they have presented all their arguments and have submitted all their evi-
dence. Most Board of Grievances proceedings exceed one year; more
complicated cases can last considerably longer.
C. THE USE OF EXPERTS AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
Some years ago, certain public sector contracts distinguished in their
"disputes" clauses between "technical" disputes and "legal" disputes.
These clauses typically provided that disputes as to "technical" matters
would be referred to a technical committee established by the parties to
such contract, and "legal" matters would be referred to the Board of
Grievances itself. Today, the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances ex-
tends to all matters arising out of claims relating to public works contracts,
be they technical or legal. In certain cases the panel decides straightfor-
ward technical questions by itself. For example, in one case with which
we are familiar, the Board itself interpreted a soil investigation report
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without resort to expert opinion in a controversy concerning the financial
consequences of unusually difficult soil conditions.
When the technical issues are complex or highly specialized, or when
they require consideration of voluminous materials, the Board of Griev-
ances will usually refer such issues to a "committee of experts." In the
past, these committees were comprised of three specialists in the field in
which the particular controversy arose; the plaintiff and the defendant
each appointed one expert, and the Board of Grievances appointed the
third. These committees acted by majority rule and presented their find-
ings in writing to the Board. Usually, a panel would adopt such a report
as its own findings.
At present, the Board of Grievances will normally refer technical mat-
ters to the Saudi House for Consulting Services, a professional and well-
regarded consulting-for-hire organization established in Riyadh in 1979.42
(Even so, when the subject matter is highly specialized we have had
success recently in persuading the Board of Grievances to accept technical
expertise from other independent sources, such as the local universities.)
The Saudi Government owns the Saudi Consulting House, but has com-
mitted itself in the establishing regulations to distribute up to fifty percent
of its ownership interest to Saudi professionals in the various technical
disciplines in which the Saudi Consulting House operates. 43Although the
Council of Ministers oversees the general policy of the Saudi Consulting
House, its day-to-day consulting operations are independent from the
Government and controlled by the professionals employed by it. In our
experience its work is highly competent and impartial.
Either the plaintiff or the defendant, or the Board of Grievances on its
own motion, may request that a technical aspect of a claim be referred
to the Saudi Consulting House. In some instances we have resisted the
involvement of the Saudi Consulting House in an action, usually on the
grounds that what appeared to be technical issues were in fact merely
contractual issues that did not require an outside consultant. In these
cases we felt that the involvement of the Saudi Consulting House would
needlessly delay or complicate the proceedings.
D. EXHIBITS, SITE VISITS, ETC.
In our experience the Board of Grievances is receptive to site visits if
convinced the exercise will assist a panel in understanding a particular
aspect of a claim. We have also made use of photographs, charts, and
42. Royal Decree No. M/17 dated 4 Jumad Thani 1399 H. [hereinafter Saudi Consulting
House Regulations].
43. Saudi Consulting House Regulations art. 2.
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models in Board hearings to illustrate points that we believed better lent
themselves to a graphic display than to prose, although such practices
are probably uncommon.
E. TYPES OF RELIEF
In the typical Board of Grievances case, the award sought is money
damages. Under the Shari'ah, a Saudi court, including the Board of Griev-
ances, will in most instances not award damages considered "speculative"
in nature, such as lost profits or lost opportunity.4 41n addition, a court
will not award interest on overdue payments, regardless of the reason for
delay, because the obligation to pay interest or monies in the nature of
interest is unenforceable in Saudi Arabia as a matter of the Shari'ah. 45
At the present time we have a case pending before a Board of Grievances
panel in which we are making a claim in respect of overdue payments.
The construction contract between our client and the Saudi governmental
employer contains a clause that provides that if payment by the employer
is not made on a timely basis, the contractor will be entitled to be paid
"the cost of the delayed payment for the period of delay" up to a maximum
of one percent per month of the contract price. We are arguing that this
clause is a liquidated damages clause and not an interest clause. The
former type of clause is generally enforceable in Saudi Arabia while the
latter is not. Thus far the panel has not given any indication that it con-
siders this claim to involve interest.
Previous Board of Grievances decisions contain precedent for awarding
liquidated damages to a contractor when the Saudi Government improp-
erly delayed payments. In one case the Board accepted the reasoning that
where a public works contract stipulated that liquidated damages be paid
by a contractor to the Saudi governmental employer when performance
of the works had been improperly delayed 46 (i.e., a delay fine), the con-
tractor was as a matter of equity also entitled to damages for improperly
delayed payments by the Saudi governmental employer even in the ab-
sence of a specific contract clause on point. The difficulty in these types
of cases is proving actual damages. For example, if a plaintiff could pro-
duce evidence it borrowed to finance the delay, the plaintiff's docu-
mentable costs such as bank charges would probably be recoverable. If,
however, the plaintiff financed such delay by internal means, the Board
of Grievances would not award damages unless direct costs could be
demonstrated and proved. The Board of Grievances also has the com-
44. 6 A. AL-SANHOURI, MASSADER AL HAQ Fi AL FIKH AL ISLAM 168 (1968).
45. Quran, Sura 2, Ayat 275-281; Sura 3, Ayat 130.
46. See also Tenders Regs. art. 9.
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petence to grant nonmonetary relief and has done so. In our experience,
however, such relief is unusual and restricted to particular situations
involving irreparable harm or damage.
To illustrate the availability of injunctive relief let us consider a case in
which a Ministry is threatening to call a guarantee of a contractor on
grounds that the contractor believes wrongful. A mere allegation that the
call was wrongful would probably not be enough for the Board of Griev-
ances to enjoin the Ministry from making such a call because money
damages (not including interest) arguably would compensate the contrac-
tor in such a situation. If the contractor were to allege that the call was
not only wrongful but also would put him into bankruptcy, thereby causing
him irreparable harm, the likelihood of an injunction would certainly
increase. Putting aside the ability of the contractor to prove impending
bankruptcy, in these circumstances the Board of Grievances conceivably
might order the Ministry not to make a call until the merits of the call
could be considered. We are theorizing here and are not aware that any
such case has ever been litigated in Saudi Arabia.
47
A more realistic possibility for obtaining injunctive relief would be a
case in which a governmental authority ordered the demolition of a build-
ing, which order was resisted by the owner on the grounds that the gov-
ernmental authority exceeded its authority in giving the order. A showing
of irreparable harm would obviously be far easier to demonstrate in this
situation.
F. JUDGMENTS
When the hearings are finally concluded, the Board of Grievances ac-
cepts the case for a period of "deliberation and judgment." During this
period, which usually measures several months (or years), depending on
the backlog of cases and the complexity of the particular case, the panel
acting at the hearings considers the various documents submitted by the
litigants. During this period, the Board may, and frequently does, at its
discretion reconvene the hearings if it finds that additional argument or
evidence is needed.
The procedures whereby the Board of Grievances renders its judgments
are not set out in any statute and are considered matters of internal
administration. We believe, however, that the following outline reasonably
accurately describes the judgment-making process of the Board of Griev-
47. The Ministry of Finance has recently instructed Saudi public sector entities that
construction contract guarantees may be called only after the convening of a "special
committee" to determine whether such a call is "justified." See 19 SAUDI ECON. SURV.,
29 Jan. 1986, at 2.
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ances. First, the panel that heard the case prepares its tentative judgment;
it then sends a draft to the President of the Board of Grievances for his
consideration. At the President's discretion, the draft judgment may in
turn be sent by the President to a "review committee" headed by the
President, and comprised also of the Deputy President and three of the
most senior judges on the Board. This review committee then studies the
draft judgment and may of its own initiative make substantive changes
therein. Upon the completion of its review, the committee sends the draft
judgment back to the President.
In the past, after the President had approved the draft judgment as
reviewed or modified, he would send it to the minister or the highest
authority of the defendant governmental authority with a request for com-
ments within a fifteen-day period. If the defendant had no comments, the
judgment was usually made the formal decision of the Board of Griev-
ances. If the defendant did have comments, the President considered them
without reference to the plaintiff. The President then either altered the
judgment to take the comments into account or directed that the judgment
be rendered notwithstanding the comments. At the present time, judg-
ments are no longer sent to the defendant prior to their rendering and are
issued directly after review by the President.
The significant role of the review committee in this process should be
well understood by plaintiffs. Some years ago we had a case in which we
submitted an agreed negotiated settlement of a public works contract claim
to the Board of Grievances for ratification. The Saudi governmental de-
fendant's outside technical consultants has also approved the negotiated
settlement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the review committee consid-
erably reduced the amount of the settlement without explanation or ref-
erence to the parties to the action, and this reduced award was made the
judgment of the Board of Grievances. Repeated attempts to appeal this
judgment on a variety of grounds over a period of years ultimately proved
unsuccessful.
Recently the Board of Grievances has begun to collect and publish
some of its decisions. At the present time, one volume has been produced
of the Board of Grievances' civil decisions, 48 but to our knowledge this
compilation has not been translated into English. Traditionally, the Saudi
courts have not accorded weight to precedent. We have, however, in the
past used the results and reasoning of previous decisions of the Board of
Grievances in arguments and briefs in subsequent unrelated Board of
Grievances proceedings. We believe that citing previous Board of Griev-
ances decisions has some value, albeit perhaps indirect.
48. Magmoui' at A/ Ma'baadi Al Shariah'at Wa Al Niza'miyah A/ Latti Gara'rat-ha
Hiyaat Wa Lijaan Wa Dawa'yr Al Diwan Fi Al Mudat in 1397-1399 (Riyadh 1404 H.).
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G. APPEALS
At the present time the law contains no provision for appeals of Board
of Grievances decisions. Such decisions are considered final when ren-
dered. This situation could change, however, if procedural rules for the
Board of Grievances are adopted and an appeals panel provided for. In
a number of cases over the years we have asked the President of the
Board of Grievances to "reconsider" decisions on the basis of what we
regarded as exceptional circumstances. This type of review was informal
and generally unsuccessful.
Theoretically, a litigant always has at least one avenue of appeal: redress
to the King. The likelihood that an appeal to the King based on an un-
favorable Board of Grievances decision would result in any change in
such decision is, however, remote. In our experience, a Saudi government
defendant, when directed to pay a judgment by the Board of Grievances,
will usually pay such judgment without obstruction or undue delay.
H. CONCLUSIONS
As with courts around the world, the proceedings of the Board of
Grievances are affected by docket congestion and the delaying tactics of
litigants. In addition, as with any court, there are good results and, oc-
casionally, disappointing results. Nonetheless, cases do move through the
Board of Grievances and both sides of a controversy have a full oppor-
tunity to be heard and judged. 49
While litigation should, in our view, continue to be viewed as a last
resort in this jurisdiction, the Board of Grievances does provide an op-
portunity for a hearing of grievances against the Saudi Government in
public sector contract disputes. Non-Saudi plaintiffs routinely win cases
and so do the Saudi governmental authorities. To the best of its ability
the Board of Grievances looks at the merits of the case and not the identity
of either of the parties to a dispute.
49. Superficial articles on the Board of Grievances undoubtedly have contributed to
Western anxiety as to Saudi legal institutions. For a typical example of this genre, see
MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REP., April 1985, at 13, in which, in an unsigned article, the
Board of Grievances is curiously described as "nascent," its procedures "shrouded in
secrecy," and the prospects "poor" for a fair resolution of disputes.
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